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The present study was designed to examine age differences in the understanding 
of counterfactual emotions and whether this understanding is reflected in social 
judgments that are influenced by counterfactual thinking.   
Six-year-olds, 8-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults were presented with 4 
scenarios involving two 2 common biases observed in adults’ counterfactual thinking: 
omission bias and temporal order bias.  In each of these scenarios, 2 characters were 
described as making a choice that resulted in the same outcome; the only difference 
between the characters was their decision process.  In the omission/commission 
scenarios, the decision of one character was framed as an act of omission whereas the 
other’s was framed as an act of commission.  In the temporal order scenarios, one 
character made his decision first whereas the other made his decision second.  In one of 
the scenarios for each bias, the outcome was positive (both characters made the correct 
decision, resulting in a prize being won by themselves and by other students in their 
classes), whereas in the other scenarios the decision resulted in a negative outcome (both 
characters made the wrong decision, resulting in a prize being lost by themselves and by 
other students in their classes).  Following the presentation of each scenario, participants 
were asked to judge which character (1) would feel worse[better], (2) be likely to be 
blamed[credited] by others, and (3) deserved to be blamed[credited]. 
The results revealed that judgments of emotions (i.e., regret & relief) and social 
ascriptions (others’ blame or credit & deserved blame or credit) were heavily influenced 
 
 
by “what might have happened” for adults whereas children’s responses were determined 
by reflections on only “what happened” (although some judgments of 11-year-olds 
resembled that of adults).  In addition, the effect of counterfactual thinking biases was 
more pronounced in the negative outcome stories than in the positive outcome stories.   
The results confirm previous evidence that counterfactual thinking ability 
gradually develops until late childhood.  Also, the results show that the judgments of 
blame and credit can take more than one form by revealing a dissociation between the 
judgments of others’ blame[credit] and deserved blame[credit]. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Have you ever imagined how things could have been different now if you had 
gone to a different school?  Married someone else?  Left earlier to catch the flight that 
you just missed?  Or switched the company you had worked for?  This mental search for 
alternatives to actual outcomes is termed counterfactual thinking and is a prominent 
feature of adult thought.  Importantly, counterfactual thinking affects our emotions 
(Roese, 2008), our social judgments (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), and how we make 
sense of life events (Teigen, 2010).    
These alternative scenarios do not come to mind in a random fashion.  Although it 
is possible to undo a past event in a number of ways, when and how we generate 
counterfactuals depends on the mutability (i.e., the ease of being undone) of a particular 
event (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  Specific qualities render some events more mutable 
than others; negative (Gleicher et al., 1990), exceptional (Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987), 
temporally close (Miller & McFarland, 1986), or committed (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) 
outcomes are more mutable than positive, typical, temporally distant, or omitted ones and 
accordingly, the first group of events trigger more counterfactual thinking than do the 
second.   
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Imagining alternative scenarios to actual events also leads to some specific 
emotions such as regret, relief, and disappointment, which are called counterfactual 
emotions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  According to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), any factor that constrains the ease of counterfactual 
generation should also affect counterfactual emotions, because these emotions also result 
from the comparison of reality with its alternatives.  Hence, the determinants of 
mutability mentioned above not only influence counterfactual generation, but also our 
counterfactual emotions as well as our attributions of counterfactual emotions and related 
social judgments regarding others (as I will discuss in detail in the subsequent sections).  
Although the influence of mutability on adults’ counterfactual thinking is well 
documented, there are only a few studies which have investigated how it affects 
children’s counterfactual thinking (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; Meehan & Byrne, 2005; 
Weisberg & Beck, 2012).  Therefore, the research proposed here is designed to examine 
how mutability of an event affects children’s judgments of others’ emotions and 
children’s judgments of blame and credit, with a focus on two common biases observed 
in adults’ counterfactual thinking: omission bias (Gleicher et al., 1990; Landman, 1987b) 
and temporal order effects (Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & 
Gunasegaram, 1990). 
Determinants of Mutability and Counterfactual Emotions 
As was noted above, Kahneman and colleagues (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986) argued that events are judged in comparison with their 
alternatives rather than in isolation, and this comparison ultimately gives rise to 
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counterfactual emotions (e.g., regret, relief, or disappointment).  Roese (1993, 1995, & 
2008) argued that counterfactual thinking serves two functions through these emotions: a 
preparative function, which prevents the recurrence of unpleasant events by drawing 
individuals’ attention to their mistakes, and an affective function, which helps individuals 
feel better about less-than-optimal events that could have ended worse (Roese & Olson, 
1995). 
Counterfactuals are categorized into two subtypes depending on their direction, 
with each linked to one of the functions mentioned above (i.e., preparative vs. affective) 
as well as some specific emotions:  Upward counterfactuals involve comparing reality 
with a better outcome, thus leading to negative emotional experiences such as regret, 
whereas downward counterfactuals (comparing reality with a worse possible outcome) 
give rise to positive affective responses such as relief (Roese, 1994; McMullen, 
Markman, & Gavanski, 1995).  
Although upward counterfactuals lead to negative emotional experiences (e.g., 
regret, disappointment), they serve the preparative function by signaling the future 
actions which would facilitate success.  Evidence for this assumption derives from a 
study by Markman and colleagues (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993), 
who found that participants who played a blackjack game on a computer created more 
upward counterfactuals in loss situations compared to the win or neutral situations.  In 
addition, the participants expecting to play the game again generated more upward 
counterfactuals than did the participants who did not hold such an expectation.  Thus, the 
authors concluded that because the information counterfactuals provide might lead to 
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better performance in the future, participants who lost or expected to play again created 
more upward counterfactuals. 
Downward counterfactuals, on the other hand, are thought to serve the affective 
function by helping individuals derive relief from representations of possible worse 
outcomes.  Support for this argument comes from studies that focused on survivors of 
trauma or a natural disaster.  For instance, Teigen and Jensen (2010) interviewed the 
survivors of the tsunami disaster that occurred in Southeast Asia in December 2004.  
They found that the amount of downward counterfactuals participants created were 10 
times more than the amount of upward counterfactuals they created.  Similarly, rape 
victims have been found to draw relief from the idea that the outcome could have been 
even worse, such as ending in more serious injury or death (Burgess & Holmstrom, 
1979).  
The Life Events Study by Roese (1994, experiment 2) provides direct evidence 
for the differential role that upward and downward counterfactuals play.  After describing 
a negative event they experienced the year before and generating either upward or 
downward counterfactuals that undo that event, participants in this study reported how 
thinking about that event made them feel.  Results showed that participants who 
generated downward counterfactuals reported experiencing more positive affect than did 
the participants who generated upward counterfactuals.  Moreover, participants who were 
asked to generate upward counterfactuals showed more preparative intentions than did 
the participants who were asked to generate downward counterfactuals.    
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Besides leading to more counterfactual thinking via rendering some events more 
mutable as previously discussed, biases in counterfactual thinking also intensify 
counterfactual emotions—the emotions experienced as a result of comparing what 
happened to what might have happened.  These emotions in turn influence our future 
behaviors and social judgments like blaming and giving credit.  In the following 
subsections, the two biases examined in this dissertation—omission and temporal order—
are discussed via examples from the adult literature. 
Omission bias. It has been found that outcomes following an action (i.e., 
commission) cause stronger emotional reactions than do identical outcomes following a 
failure to act (i.e., omission).  For instance, Kahneman and Miller (1986) gave 
participants a story about two businessmen who own shares in two different companies.  
The character who has shares in company A considers switching his stock to company B 
but fails to do so, whereas the other character with shares in company B switches his 
stocks from company B to company A.  At the end, both characters find out that if they 
had owned stock in Company B, they would have been better off.  When asked which 
character would feel worse about the loss, the majority of participants judged that the 
character who switched from B to A would feel more regretful than the one who owned 
shares in A at the outset. Kahneman and Miller (1986) argued that because bringing 
conditions back to their usual states is less effortful by undoing an act rather than by 
adding an unperformed act, the outcomes following an act of commission lead to more 
regret than do outcomes following an act of omission (See also, Landman, 1987b; 
Gleicher et al., 1990).  
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Temporal order bias. Imagine a scenario in which two characters (Jon and 
Michael) are given a chance to win an attractive reward.  If both characters pick the same 
color card from a shuffled deck of cards, each would win 1000 British pounds, but if they 
pick different colored cards, neither of them would win anything.  Jon goes first and 
picks a red card whereas Michael, who goes next, picks a black card; thus, they end up 
winning nothing.  When asked to mutate one event in this story to make these characters 
win, participants tended to alter Michael’s—the second player’s—choice (i.e., “if only he 
selected a red card”) rather than Jon’s.  Participants also judge that Michael would feel 
worse than Jon about the outcome, demonstrating the phenomenon called temporal order 
bias (Byrne et al., 2000). 
The effect of temporal order has been demonstrated in daily situations as well.  
When participants in a study by Sherman and McConnell (1996) judged how a basketball 
team could have had a better season, the majority tended to alter the outcome of the last 
game of the season although they were explicitly warned that their judgments should 
reflect games of the entire season.   
 Several explanations have been suggested for the temporal order bias.  Some 
authors argue that in a temporal order, later events are still fresh in working memory 
which would render them more available to be remembered and changed compared to 
earlier events (Miller & Gunesagaram, 1990).  Another line of research (Byrne et al., 
2000) entertained the possibility that temporal order bias might arise because the first 
event in a sequence of events is taken as an “anchor”, and thus is presupposed, which 
makes it relatively resistant to change.   
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A study by Byrne and colleagues (2000) found evidence for the second 
explanation.  In their first experiment, they interrupted the temporal order of events in the 
story described above in such a way that a technical difficulty occurs after the first player 
picks the black card.  Once the technical issue is resolved and game starts from the 
beginning, the first player changes his mind and picks the red card.  The second player 
goes next and picks the black card, and thus nobody wins the prize.  When asked to 
change an event to make these characters win, the participants tended to change the first 
player’s decision, which ruled out the explanation that the most recent event is prone to 
change due to being fresh in the memory and showed that the first element in a sequence 
of events is usually presupposed, thus, resistant to change. 
Counterfactual Thinking and Social Judgments 
Counterfactuals have a close relationship with the attributions of causality—the 
marker of blame judgments.  When creating counterfactuals, the most easily mutated 
aspect of an event is also generally perceived as the cause of that event (Sherman & 
McConnell, 1996), which then becomes the target for blame attributions.  A study by 
Gavanski and Wells (1989) nicely illustrates this phenomenon:  When participants were 
asked to imagine a scenario in which a woman dies due to an allergic reaction to the food 
ordered by her boss, the causal role of the boss is judged to be larger when he had the 
choice of an alternative meal with no allergic ingredient than when the alternative meal 
also included the allergic ingredient.  Similarly, the causal role of a taxi driver refusing to 
take a paraplegic couple who later dies in a car accident was rated higher when the 
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alternative undid the event (the taxi driver himself safely crosses the bridge) than when it 
did not (the taxi driver also fell from the bridge and drowned).  
Although being perceived as the cause of a negative event increases the likelihood 
of blameworthiness, it is not always sufficient to render an act culpable; people also take 
some other qualities of acts into account when making blame judgments.  One such 
quality is the degree of control over the harmful outcome.  It has been found that if 
perpetrators are perceived as having increased control over the outcome, they are 
attributed more blame and given less compensation (Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & 
Beike, 2003).  The culpable blame model (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2006) 
explains the link between mutability and blame as follows: The awareness that the 
harmful outcome could have been avoided amplifies the emotional reactions of observers 
and whether this amplified affect will lead to blame judgments depends on the observers’ 
perception of outcome control.  If the observer concludes that the perpetrator had taken 
all precautions to prevent the harmful outcome but was unsuccessful, then she or he is 
evaluated as not culpable for what happened.  On the other hand, if the observers 
conclude that the negative event is a result of negligence, then the perpetrator is judged as 
culpable and the judgments of blame increase.  Thus, a mutable event will lead to greater 
blame only if the perpetrator is judged as having some control.  
Previous research has similarly demonstrated an effect of temporal order on 
blame judgments.  For instance, for one of the previously mentioned stories in which two 
characters are supposed to pick the same card to win a prize, the participants not only 
altered the second player’s hand more than the first player’s, but they also thought that 
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the second player would feel more regretful and would be blamed more by the first player 
(Miller & Gunesagaram, 1990).   
Similarly, a study by Miller and Gunesagaram (1990) also demonstrated how 
temporal order bias is reflected in blame judgments.  In this experiment, subjects were 
given a role of either teacher or student and asked to prepare exam questions about an 
article.  In order to generate an effect of temporality, two conditions were created; in the 
student-first condition, student participants were made aware that they were the first to 
prepare the questions, whereas in the student-second condition, they were told that the 
teacher came early and prepared the questions already.  The results revealed that when 
the questions of students and teachers did not match, students criticized a teacher more 
when the teacher selected the questions after they did, reflecting the tendency that the 
second event in a pair of events is perceived as more mutable and blameworthy than the 
first.  They also tended to judge the questions selected by the teacher—whose questions 
did not match theirs—more reasonable and fairer when the teacher prepared the questions 
before they studied than when s/he prepared them after they studied.  Moreover, when 
students played the role of the teachers, they picked the easier questions when they 
prepared them after students studied compared to when they prepared them before 
students begin studying, revealing how their behavior is shaped by the anticipation of 
blame from the students (Miller & Gunesagaram, 1990).  These findings reveal that in the 
case of temporality bias, the judgments of regret parallel the judgments of blame. 
Interestingly, a recent study (Payir, Guttentag, & Burns, 2014) revealed that 
people’s judgments of “how much one will be blamed by others” and “how much one 
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deserves to be blamed” may follow a different pattern.  In this study, participants 
attributed an amount of regret, blame by others, and deserved blame to different 
characters who made a decision that determined whether this character and his classmates 
will win a prize.  The characters made their choices either by tossing a coin, deciding on 
their own, deciding on an option and then changing their mind, or ignoring the advice 
from others while making the choice, and all choices led to the same negative outcome 
(i.e., losing the prize).  The results demonstrated a difference between the amount of 
regret, blame by others, and deserved blame across the four conditions; moreover, the 
amount of regret and blame by others followed a similar pattern whereas there was a 
dissociation between blame by others and blame deserved, with the former being greater 
than the latter.  Interestingly, for the stories with the positive outcome (i.e., winning the 
prize), different conditions led to different amount of relief and credit as well, however, 
there was no dissociation between credit by others and deserved credit, suggesting that 
different factors, at least to some degree, affect judgments of blame and credit.  
What accounts for the dissociation found by Payir et al. (2014) between blame by 
others and blame deserved?  The dual process theory of moral reasoning (Greene et al., 
2001) suggests that our moral judgments are under the control of two distinct 
mechanisms: automatic settings and manual mode.  There are different types of 
automatic settings—reflexes and intuitions to name a couple—but the common feature 
underlying them is relying on emotions.  On the other hand, manual mode leads to a more 
cognitively controlled and reflective judgment.  In order to illustrate how automatic 
settings and manual mode differ, Greene (2014) uses the classical trolley problem 
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(Thomson, 1985), in which people are asked to imagine a trolley approaching five 
workmen, and the only possible way to save them is having one other man killed.  
Generally, people think that it is morally acceptable to switch the trolley to another track 
away from five workmen and onto one (the switch case); however, they think that it is 
morally unacceptable to throw a fat man off a footbridge in front of the running trolley to 
stop it killing five men (the footbridge case), although both of these actions have the 
same cost/benefit ratio.  Greene (2014) argues that the answer to the switch case results 
from the manual mode (“It is okay to switch the train to save more lives.”) whereas the 
answer to the footbridge case results from the automatic settings (“It is not okay to push 
one to save more.”).  The evidence for this reasoning comes from the neuroimaging 
studies revealing that the former problem leads to an activation in brain areas associated 
with controlled cognition whereas the latter leads to an activation in brain areas 
associated with emotion (Greene, 2014). 
Applying dual-process theory to Payir et al.’s (2014) findings suggests that when 
participants made judgments of blame by others, they assumed that automatic settings are 
likely predominate as an influence on people’s moral judgments in this context; 
accordingly, participants judged that blame by others would be affected by the same 
factors as, and would closely track in intensity, feelings of regret of the scenario 
protagonist.  In contrast, asking participants to explicitly reflect on how much blame was 
deserved would be likely to evoke more manual mode styles at analyses, resulting, in this 
case (in which all outcomes were actually determined by chance) in much lower ratings 
of deserved blame than blame by others.  
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As previously mentioned, the dissociation between blame by others and deserved 
blame was not observed regarding the paralleling judgments in positive outcome 
scenarios (i.e., credit by others and deserved credit).  For these scenarios, credit by others 
and deserved credit were mostly—but not entirely—similar to the patterns of relief.  It is 
not clear why deserved blame is different from blame by others whereas deserved credit 
is similar to credit by others.  One explanation would be that both judgments of credit are 
the product of the manual mode whereas blame by others is the product of automatic 
settings.  In any case, it is noteworthy in this context that the Payir et al. (2014) study is 
not the first to have found the factors that affect social judgments following positive 
outcomes are not always the same as the factors that affect social judgments following 
negative outcomes.  For example, it has been found that base-rate (i.e., estimates of the 
probability of an outcome) information does not affect the amount of blame attributed to 
an immoral act whereas it affects the amount of credit attributed to a moral act (McGraw, 
1987).  Similarly, although situational factors have no influence on blame assigned to an 
immoral act, it influences how much credit is assigned to a moral act (McGraw, 1985, 
experiment 1), in line with the finding that mental state attributions have less influence on 
credit judgments than they have on blame judgments (Fincham, 1985).  Although the acts 
described in stories used in the current study did not vary as a function of morality 
valence (i.e., they were neither moral nor immoral and the outcome was determined by 
chance) unlike the studies mentioned above, these studies are still important revealing 
that asymmetries occur between the judgments of blame and credit (Ross & Ditecco, 
1975).  
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Development of Counterfactual Thinking 
In 1996, Harris, German, and Mills conducted a study in which they told young 
children short stories involving a mishap—for instance, a girl who walks into a clean 
room with her muddy shoes and makes the floor dirty.  After answering the questions 
testing their memory of the event (i.e., “Is the floor dirty now?” & “Was the floor dirty 
before?”), children judged whether the floor would still be dirty if the girl had taken her 
shoes off.  This question required them to engage in counterfactual reasoning, because 
participants needed to imagine an alternative outcome—in which the character takes her 
shoes off—to an already occurred outcome in order to reach the correct judgment that 
“the floor would be clean”.  Harris and colleagues (1996) found that children as young as 
3 are capable of providing this answer. 
Other studies have located the beginnings of counterfactual thinking at somewhat 
older ages.  For instance, Riggs and colleagues (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 
1998) found that children aged 5 and younger find both counterfactual thinking and false-
belief tasks equally difficult, which, according to the authors, originates from the fact that 
both tasks require imagining a counterfactual situation as well as being able to disengage 
from “here and now”.  For example, in one of their stories, Peter, a firefighter, was at 
home when Sally went out.  Next, Peter received a call and had to leave home to put out 
the fire in the post office.  When children were asked “If there had been no fire, where 
would Peter be now?” (Counterfactual reasoning task) and “Where does Sally think Peter 
is?” (false-belief task), children aged five and younger found both tasks difficult (See also 
Guajardo, Parker, & Turley-Ames; 2009 for a similar pattern of results).  The finding that 
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children with autism—a population known to experience problems in false-belief tasks—
have similar difficulties with counterfactual thinking tasks (Peterson & Bowler, 2000) 
further supports this argument.  Still other studies showed that the performance of 3-year-
olds in counterfactual reasoning tasks decreases sharply when presented with positive 
events (German, 1999) and that they can reason counterfactually only when the task itself 
is relatively easy (German & Nichols, 2003). 
 Taking an individual differences approach, some researchers (Beck, Riggs, & 
Gorniak, 2009; Beck et al., 2011; Burns, Riggs, & Beck, 2012) argued that the degree to 
which executive function (EF) abilities play a role in counterfactual reasoning can inform 
us about the nature of the difficulty children experience in counterfactual (CF) reasoning 
tasks.  Using a battery of CF and EF (inhibitory control & working memory) tasks, Burns 
and colleagues (2012) found that inhibitory control, but not working memory, predicted 
children’s performance on CF tasks. 
 Rafetseder and colleagues (Rafetseder & Perner; 2014) have argued that the 
studies demonstrating counterfactual reasoning by children younger than 6 failed to 
control for the possibility that children could have been relying on basic, non-
counterfactual forms of reasoning.  For instance, Rafetseder and colleagues argued that 
when children reach the conclusion that “the floor would be clean if Carol had taken her 
shoes off”’ (Harris et al, 1996), they simply made use of the well-known fact that “if 
people take their dirty shoes off when entering a clean room, floors will stay clean” rather 
than simulating the counterfactual world in which Carol takes her shoes off.  This 
argument received support when only a small percentage of 5-year-olds reached the 
15 
 
correct conclusion (that the floors would still be dirty) after adding a second character—
who walks after Carol did and makes the floor dirty—to the original story.  Thus, 
Rafetseder and colleagues concluded that counterfactual reasoning develops gradually 
and is not fully achieved before the age of 12.  
Development of Counterfactual Emotions 
The realization that an unpleasant experience could have been avoided results in 
feelings of regret, whereas the realization that a potentially aversive outcome has just 
been avoided leads to an experience of relief.  Children’s experience of regret and relief 
has usually been studied in the context of a chance game where children make (or witness 
others make) a choice between different options and rate how they (or others) feel about 
the choice they (or others) made at different points:  once after the disclosure of the 
chosen option and once following the disclosure of the unchosen option.  In an initial 
series of studies using this procedure, Amsel and Smalley (2000) found that the 
information about the alternate state of affairs—the unchosen box including either a 
better (regret trials) or worse (relief trials) prize—did not lead to a decrease or an increase 
in children’s ratings of their own and others’ happiness for children aged 5 or younger, 
revealing that they neither experience nor understand regret and relief until age 6 or 
older. 
Using the same procedure, Weisberg and Beck (2010) found that at around the 
age of 5 to 6, children begin to feel less happy about their choice when the alternate 
option includes a better prize; they experience regret although there is no attribution of 
regret to others up to the age of 7.  Their relief trials revealed that before the age of 7, 
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children neither feel relieved nor attribute relief to others upon realizing that the alternate 
option leads to a worse outcome.  Although Weisberg and Beck (2012) found an earlier 
age for the experience of regret (at age 4) and relief (at age 5) in a later study using a 
different scale for the second emotion rating (after revealing the content of the unchosen 
option), studies which also controlled repeated questioning (O’connor, McCormack, & 
Feeney, 2012; Burns et al., 2012) found no evidence for the experience of regret up to the 
age of 6.  
Not surprisingly, the experiments conducted by Rafetseder and Perner (2012) did 
not demonstrate an experience of regret before the age of 9.  As previously mentioned, 
these authors argued that the so-called lag between reasoning counterfactually and 
experiencing counterfactual emotions is due to the spurious results created by the tasks 
which do not really require children to compare the actual state of affairs with the 
alternate ones (Rafetseder et al., 2012; 2014, Perner & Rafetseder, 2011).  Indeed, the 
authors provided some convincing evidence that the studies claiming to find an earlier 
age for regret provide the evidence for the experience of frustration—the experience of 
which, unlike regret, does not require a comparison between what happened and what 
might have happened—rather than regret (Rafetseder et al., 2012).   
In order to investigate how children make judgments of regret and relief in others, 
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) presented children with stories about two characters who 
need to decide between two courses of action.  Each story was different only in terms of 
the characters’ context of decision-making:  One character did the things that he or she 
typically does, whereas the other character chose to act atypically.  The participants’ task 
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was to judge which character would feel worse about the outcome or whether they should 
feel the same.  Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) found that children aged 7 years or older 
thought the character whose decision were framed as atypical would feel worse than the 
character whose decision was framed as typical.  However, 5-year-old children judged 
that both characters should feel the same about what happened, thus showing no signs of 
the understanding of regret at age 5.  Similarly, in a second experiment, the researchers 
found that when judging two characters who experienced the same negative outcome, 
children aged 7 years or older thought that the character whose decision was framed as an 
act of commission would feel worse than the character whose decision was framed as an 
act of omission, whereas 5-year-old children judged that both characters would feel the 
same. 
Mutability and Children’s Counterfactual Thinking 
To our knowledge, there is only one developmental study (Guttentag and Ferrell, 
2004) that investigated whether children’s thinking is prone to the typicality bias.  As 
mentioned in the above section, Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) found that children aged 7 
years or older showed typicality bias by thinking that the character whose decision were 
framed as atypical would feel worse than the character whose decision was framed as 
typical.  However, 5-year-old children thought both characters should feel the same about 
the outcome, thereby showing no signs of typicality bias.  In the same study, the 
researchers also found that up to the age of 5, children are not prone to the omission bias 
at least when making judgments regarding the emotions of others; they judged that two 
characters would feel the same in result of the same negative outcome although one 
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character’s decision was framed as an act of commission whereas the other’s was framed 
as an act of omission. 
Meehan and Byrne (2005) conducted the first study which examined the effect of 
temporal order in young children’s counterfactual thinking.  Using the card game story 
previously described, they investigated whether 6- and 8-years-old children are sensitive 
to the standard temporal order effect.  Their results showed that both age groups showed 
the temporal order effect, thus, they tended to change the second player’s decision rather 
than the first.  This study also investigated how temporality affects children’s judgments 
of emotions (regret) and social attributions (blame), which will be discussed in the 
following sections.   
Counterfactual Thinking and Children’s Judgments of Emotions and Social 
Attributions 
 What clues do children rely on when they make attributions of regret, relief, 
blame, credit, or victim compensation?  Does counterfactual thinking have any effect on 
these judgments?  Unfortunately, the developmental studies that link counterfactual 
thinking and social judgments are quite scarce—excluding the studies that concerned 
how children attribute counterfactual emotions to others that I discussed previously—and 
the research focusing on these judgments mostly study them from a moral development 
perspective.   
 Traditionally, there is a dichotomy in terms of what children take into account 
when making moral judgments.  One perspective—in accordance with Piaget (1932, as 
mentioned in Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009)—argues that outcome is the most 
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important determinant of the moral judgments children make; yet, another line of 
research states that Piaget underestimated the sophistication of children’s judgment, for 
which intention is the major decision point (Nobes et al., 2009).   
In order to understand the factors that children rely on when making moral 
judgments, researchers studying moral development design experiments where children 
decide whether an act is acceptable or not.  In one of these studies (Zelazo, Helwig, & 
Lau, 1996), adults and 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds judged whether a behavior was acceptable 
and assigned punishment to the perpetrator (either punish or not) in both normal (e.g., 
hitting causes the animal to cry & petting makes the animal smile) and noncanonical (i.e., 
hitting makes the animal smile & petting makes the animal cry) scenarios focusing on 
physical harm.  The results showed that although all participants based their judgments of 
acceptability relying in part on outcome, with age, there was an increasing sensitivity to 
intention information.  There were age differences in punishment judgments as well; 
adults and 5-year-olds tended to use the conjunction rule (punish when both the intention 
and outcome is negative) whereas the two younger age groups tended to rely only on 
either intention or outcome.  According to the authors, these results show that young 
children’s moral judgments operate via some underlying moral concepts such as harm, 
which help children create moral rules that can be generalized across situations.  The 
same pattern of results was found in a follow-up study, which focused on psychological 
harm using the same procedure described above (Helwig, Zelazo, and Wilson, 2001). 
On the other hand, a recent study by Nobes et al. (2009) demonstrated that 
intention is the major influence on children’s moral judgments (i.e., acceptability of an 
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accidental act) and outcome—along with negligence—affect these judgments only when 
the act is deliberate or intended.  According to these authors, previous studies, which 
attributed a greater role to the outcome, confounded outcome and negligence; when the 
outcome was negative, children—who have a tendency to think that everything can be 
foreseen, hence, prevented—assumed that the agent was careless. 
In one of the two developmental studies which focused the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and social judgments, Meehan and Byrne (2005) examined the 
role of temporal order on children’s regret and blame judgments.  This study showed that, 
starting from the age 6, children are prone to the temporal order effect—previously 
demonstrated in adults’ “if only” judgments and regret attributions.  However, for 6-year-
olds, there was a dissociation between “if only” thoughts and the judgments of guilt and 
blame:  Although 6-year-olds also had a tendency to alter the second player’s decision, 
they did not show any preference for “who feels more guilt” or “who will be blamed 
more by the other”.  According to the authors, this dissociation may be an indication that 
their counterfactual thinking is still under development. 
A study by Powell, Derbyshire, and Guttentag (2012) examined the extent to 
which three moral principles—omission, physical contact, and intention—affect 
judgments of children and adults.  In their first experiment, they investigated the role of 
omission bias in moral judgments using two different kinds of stories about a switch 
operator who makes a decision about pulling (commission) or not pulling (omission) a 
switch to make a train move to a different track.  In harm-only stories, the negative 
outcome (i.e., one child getting splashed) occurs due to either omission (i.e., the switch 
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operator does not pull the switch causing the train to pass across a puddle splashing 
water) or commission (i.e., the switch operator pulls the switch which makes the train 
move to a different track splashing water).  In harm/benefit stories, on the other hand, the 
same behaviors of the switch operator (i.e., not pulling the switch/omission, pulling the 
switch/commission) lead to a benefit (i.e., saving 5 kids from getting splashed) in 
addition to causing harm (i.e., getting one child splashed).   
The results revealed that, for all ages, the switch operator’s behavior is judged as 
worse in harm-only stories.  Interestingly, 5 to 6 year-olds continued to judge the 
operator’s behaviors as bad in harm/benefit stories as well, whereas 7 to 8 year-olds and 
adults judged the operator’s behaviors as good in these stories.  In terms of omission bias, 
participants from all age groups judged commission as worse in harm-only stories, thus 
providing evidence for the existence of this bias in moral judgments for all ages.  
However, young children’s responses differed from older children’s and adults’ for 
harm/benefit stories:  Although adults and the 7-8 year-olds concluded commission as 
better when the operator switched to splash one child while saving other five, the 5-6 
year-olds did not exhibit any preference between omission and commission in 
harm/benefit stories, judging both operators’ behavior as equally good or bad.   
Present Study 
 Mutability in counterfactual thinking affects several aspects of psychological 
functioning; biases that render some outcomes more mutable than others modify our 
emotional expression and interpretation of situations, our decision-making, and our 
judgments of others.  Thus, our personal and social lives are greatly influenced by 
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mutability generated by these biases, and yet we do not know very much about how these 
biases develop and how they manage to exert their influence.    
Studying the development of counterfactual thinking biases that determine 
mutability can help us understand their origin:  Do they emerge together with the ability 
to think counterfactually, or are they derived from other aspects of development (Beck et 
al., 2014)?  If these biases emerge with the ability to think counterfactually, then children 
should show these biases as soon as they start to engage in counterfactual thinking.  On 
the other hand, if they derive from some other aspect of development, then these biases 
may be partially dissociated from the development of counterfactual thinking and may 
only emerge as children gain more experience with counterfactual thinking.  Hence, the 
biases and counterfactual thinking should not necessarily emerge at the same point in 
development.   
The studies conducted so far (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; Meehan & Byrne, 2005; 
Weisberg & Beck, 2012) have found age differences in the extent to which these biases 
affect judgments, thus supporting the second notion that children’s reasoning is prone to 
these biases only after they are first able to engage in counterfactual thinking.  However, 
the number and scope of these studies are limited, which calls for further study.  Hence, 
the overarching goal of this study was to examine the developmental change in the ability 
to understand the situations which create regret and relief in others, and the degree to 
which this understanding reflected in social judgments such as blame and credit.  
Using two different outcomes (i.e., negative & positive), the effect of mutability 
on children’s judgments of counterfactual emotions and social attributions were 
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investigated via two factors that have been found to affect mutability: omission and 
temporal order.  In the omission/commission scenarios, the choice of one character was 
framed as an act of omission whereas the other’s was framed as an act of commission.  In 
the temporal order scenarios, one character made his choice first whereas the other made 
his choice second.  In the positive outcome scenarios, both characters win a prize whereas 
in the negative outcome scenarios, both characters lose a prize as a result of the choices 
they made.  After each story, participants were asked to make judgments of who would 
feel worse[better], who would be blamed[credited] more by others, and who deserves 
more blame[credit].   
Based on the previous literature, it was predicted that adults and older children 
will take “what might have happened” into account when making their judgments.  
Hence, they will mostly pick the target response reflecting the effect of mutability—
created by omission/commission and temporal order biases—on their social judgments.  
On the other hand, because younger children will heavily rely on “what happened” when 
responding, they will not provide the target response significantly more than other 
responses revealing no effect of mutability on their judgments.  It was specifically 
hypothesized that the mutability has the following effects on the judgments of 
participants: 
(1) Among all age groups, 6-year-olds will be the least likely to judge that the target 
character would feel worse[better] and would be blamed[credited] more by others; 
the majority of 6-year-olds will distribute regret[relief] and blame[credit] by 
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others equally between the two acts (i.e., omitted vs. committed & first vs. 
second). 
(2) Starting from age 8, the majority of child participants will judge that the target 
character would feel worse[better] and would be blamed[credited] more by others. 
However, there will be some significant age differences regarding this ability: 11-
year-olds will be more likely than 8-year-olds to make this judgment. 
(3) The influence of mutability will be attenuated in positive outcome stories 
compared to negative outcome stories; however, this effect will be reflected on 
the responses of 11-year-olds and adults only. 
(4) There will be a dissociation between blame by others and deserved blame 
judgments: Participants’ judgments will be more likely to be influenced by 
mutability when they make judgments about others’ blame compared to when 
they make judgments about deserved blame.  Hence, others’ blame judgments 
will lead to more target responses than deserved blame judgments.  We have no 
strong prediction for a similar dissociation between credit by others and deserved 
credit judgments. 
The present study contributes to our understanding of the development of 
counterfactual thinking in several important ways.  First, this is the only study that 
examines the effects of two different factors known to affect mutability—omission and 
temporal order—within the context of a similar set of scenarios, and these biases were 
studied here via their effects on both emotions and social judgments (e.g., regret & 
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blame), permitting us to assess whether these two forms of judgments are affected by 
event mutability factors in similar ways across age.     
Second, the present research extends previous findings by examining whether 
counterfactual thinking biases in children operate differently in positively versus 
negatively charged outcomes.  A study from our lab (Payir et al., 2014) found that credit 
judgments do not follow the pattern of blame judgments and that judgments regarding the 
amount of blame thought to be attributed by others differs from the amount of blame that 
is judged to be actually deserved.  The present study is the first to inspect these 
dissociations (originally observed in adults’ emotional and social judgments) in 
children’s judgments.   
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
 The child participants were 18 6-year-olds (8 females, M = 6.62 years, SD = .42 
years, range = 6.03 years – 6.92 years), 20 8-year-olds (10 females, M = 8.44 years, SD = 
.34 years, range = 8 years – 8.99 years), and 19 11-year-olds (14 females, M = 11.48 
years, SD = .34 years, range = 11 years – 11.95 years).  One 6-years-old and one 8-years-
old could not participate in the second of two testing sessions, so they could not provide 
their responses for the positive outcome stories.  All Participants were recruited from a 
private school and provided parent consent for participation.  
 Adult participants were 72 undergraduate students (50 females) who participated 
for course credit. 
Materials 
Appendix B includes the four stories and task questions that were used in the 
study.  In two of these stories (omission/commission story 1 & temporal order story 1) 
two students and their classmates experience a negative outcome as a result of the choices 
these two students make.  Although the students and their classmates experience the same 
negative outcome (not winning a prize) in each story, the actions of one character (the 
target character) was rendered more mutable than the other’s: In the  
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omission/commission story, the target character switches from one choice to the other 
(commission) whereas the other does not (omission).  In the temporal order story, one 
character makes his choice first whereas the other (the target character) makes his choice 
second.  
After each story, the participants were asked to answer (1) whether one character 
would feel worse than the other about their choice or they would they feel equally bad, 
(2) whether one character would be blamed more than the other by their classmates or 
they would they be blamed equally, and (3) whether one character deserves more blame 
than the other or do they deserve equal blame.  Participants were also asked to explain 
their responses to each of these questions.  
In the remaining two stories (omission/commission 2 & temporal order 2), two 
students make a choice that leads to a win for themselves and their classmates.  As in the 
negative outcome stories, the characters in each story experience the same outcome 
(winning a prize) and one character’s choice was rendered more mutable than other’s 
using the same procedure described above.  After each of the positive outcome stories, 
the participants answered the following questions: (1) whether one character would feel 
better than the other about their choice or would they feel equally good, (2) whether one 
character would be credited more than the other by their classmates or would they be 
credited equally, and (3) whether one character deserves more credit than the other or do 
they deserve equal credit.  Participants were also asked to explain their responses to these 
questions. 
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With children, the experimenter used puppets, cards, and boxes (see Appendix C) 
to act out the flow of the events as she read each story.  The puppets were designed in a 
way that did not depict the emotional reactions of the characters.  In order to include both 
genders in the stories, the characters in the omission/commission stories were presented 
as females whereas the characters in the temporal order story were presented as males. 
The names of the characters were clearly written on each puppet.  
Procedure 
 All participants received the four stories and their accompanying questions as 
described above.  Each participant received either the two positive outcome stories first 
or the two negative outcome stories first.  The order of positive versus negative outcome 
stories was counterbalanced as best as possible across participants at each age.  Similarly, 
the ordering of the story type (omission/commission vs temporal order) was 
counterbalanced as best as possible across participants at each age, such that if a 
participant received the positive omission/commission story before the positive temporal 
order story, that participant also received the negative omission/commission story before 
the negative temporal order story.  All participants were asked the task questions in the 
same order for all stories: (1) emotion question, (2) blame or credit from others question, 
(3) deserving blame or credit question. 
The task procedure was adjusted slightly to meet the response ability level of 
participants in each age group.  Adults received booklets that included the four stories. 
Each story was printed on a separate page with their accompanying questions.  After each 
story, adults were reminded about the key elements of the story before being presented 
29 
 
with the questions and at the end of each question, space was provided for them to write 
their answers.  They completed the study in a single setting as one group in their 
classroom. 
 Because testing children for negative and positive outcome stories at a single  
session would be exhaustive for them, child participants completed the study in two 
sessions held between one and two weeks apart.  Six and 8-year-olds were tested 
individually in a quiet room in their school. The experimenter told the stories using 
puppets to depict the flow of the events.  After each story, the experimenter reminded 
children about the key elements of the story via asking comprehension questions (e.g. 
“So, Amy picked which box?”) and any wrong answers were corrected at this time. 
Children answered the task questions in any way that they desired (i.e., by pointing, by 
calling out a name, or by using the puppets) and the experimenter kept a written record of 
responses.  A slightly different procedure was used with 11-year-olds, who were tested in 
groups of 2 to 4 in a quiet room in their school. They were provided with the booklets 
that adults received and instructed to listen to the experimenter as she told the stories 
using the puppets. After reminding the children about the key elements of the story, the 
experimenter asked each task question in the order described above.  After every 
question, experimenter waited for each child to write their response before posing the 
next question.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Gender effects. A preliminary analysis revealed that there were no significant 
effects of gender on participants’ judgments of emotions or their judgments of blame and 
credit.  Accordingly, gender was not included as a variable in any of the analyses 
described below.  
 Order effects. A preliminary analysis also revealed that there was no significant 
effect of story order on participants’ judgments.  Accordingly, story order was not 
included as a variable in any of the analyses described below. 
  Outcome effects. Paired t-tests were run between the judgments of regret vs. 
relief, blame by others vs. credit by others, and deserved blame vs. deserved credit in 
order to assess whether the effect of mutability was more pronounced in negative 
outcome stories than it was in positive outcome stories.  Participants were given 1 point if 
they had selected the target response and 0 if they had selected any other response 
(nontarget & equal). 
The paired t-tests revealed that participants were more likely to attribute regret (M 
= .64, SD = .48) than to attribute relief (M = .46, SD = .50) to the target characters, t(253) 
= 5.44, p < .01.  They were also more likely to attribute blame (M = .59, SD = .49) than to
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attribute credit (M = .26, SD = .44) to the target characters, t(253) = 9.73, p < .01 and 
thought that the target characters deserve blame more (M = .18, SD = .38) than they 
deserve credit (M = .11, SD = .11), t(253) = 2.52, p < .05.  Accordingly, separate analyses 
were conducted for responses to the positive outcome vs. the negative outcome stories. 
 Story Effects. In order to test whether the effect of mutability was more 
pronounced in one type of story than the other, a paired t-test was run to compare the 
judgments of regret[relief], blame[credit] by others, and deserved blame[credit] across 
the omission/commission and temporal order stories using the same scoring procedure 
above.  
 The mean for the judgments of regret did not differ across the stories; however, 
the mean for blame by others judgments was higher in the temporal order story (M = .65, 
SD = .48) than in the omission/commission story, (M = .51, SD = .50), t(128) = 2.62, p = 
.01.  The means for the judgments of deserved blame for the two stories were not 
significantly different. 
 In terms of positive outcome stories, the mean of relief in the temporal order story 
(M = .54, SD = .50) was significantly higher than the mean of relief in the 
omission/commission story (M = .39, SD = .49), t(126) = 3.20, p = .01.  The temporal 
order story also led to higher credit by others judgments (M = .54, SD = .50) compared to 
the omission/commission story (M = .15, SD = .36), t(126) = 4.79, p = .01.  The same 
pattern of difference was observed between the two stories for the judgments of deserved 
credit (M = .17, SD = .38 vs. M = .05, SD = .21), t(126) = 3.26, p = .01.  Because of the 
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differences that were found between the two types of stories, we analyzed each story type 
separately. 
Age Differences in Judgments of Emotions and Social Attributions 
Negative outcome stories. Table 1 presents the percentage of participants at each 
age providing each type of response —target, nontarget, and equal—in each story for the 
judgments of regret, blame by others, and deserved blame.  In the omission/commission 
story, the target character was the one whose choice was framed as an act of commission 
and in the temporal order story, the target character was the one who made his decision 
second.  
Because the focus was on the effect of mutability, hence the amount of “target 
response”, the responses other than “target” were combined into a single “other” category 
and a 4 (ages) x 2 (Target vs. Other responses) chi-square analysis was conducted for 
each judgment type—regret, blame by others, and deserved blame.   
Omission/Commission story. There was a significant age difference for 
judgments of regret, χ² (3, N = 129) = 36.38, p < .01.  Paired comparisons revealed that 
the percentage of 6-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 90) = 32.47, p <.01, 8-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 92) = 
16.70, p <.01, and 11-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 91) = 6.55, p = .01, who thought that the target 
character would feel worse was significantly smaller than the percentage of adults who 
made that judgment.  Also, significantly fewer 6-year-olds than 11-year-olds concluded 
that the target character would feel worse, χ² (1, N = 37) = 6.68, p = .01.  The differences 
between the regret judgments of 6- and 8-year-olds and 8- and 11-year-olds were not 
significant. 
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 The judgments of blame by others revealed a similar pattern of responses.  There 
was a significant age difference, χ² (3, N = 129) = 37.90, p <.01, and pairwise 
comparisons yielded the following results: The percentage of participants in each child 
group who concluded that the target character’s classmates would blame the target 
character more than the non-target character was significantly smaller than the percentage 
of adults who provided that response, χ² (1, N = 90) = 27.79, p <.01, χ² (1, N = 92) = 
19.09, p <.01, and χ² (1, N = 91) = 6.75, p <.01, for the comparisons of the adults with the 
6-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and 11-year-olds respectively.  Also, the percentage of 11-year-
olds who provided the target response was significantly greater than the percentage of 6-
year-olds who provided that response, χ² (1, N = 37) = 6.71, p = .01.  None of the other 
pairwise comparisons were significant. 
 In marked contrast with the analyses of regret and blame by others, a chi-square 
analysis for the judgments of deserved blame did not reveal any significant age 
differences in patterns of responding. 
Additional analyses were run to test the hypotheses that the judgments of regret 
will resemble the judgments of others’ blame and that judgments of others’ blame will 
differ from the judgments of deserved blame.  As hypothesized, there was no significant 
difference between the judgments of regret and others’ blame whereas judgments of 
deserved blame led to significantly less target responses compared to others’ blame, χ² (1, 
N = 258) = 25.57, p <.01.  When individual tests for each age group were conducted to 
see which group’s responses differed between the judgments of others’ blame and 
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deserved blame, we found that this was the case for the adults, χ² (1, N = 144) = 36.03, p 
<.01, and the 11-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 38) = 4.89, p <.05. 
Temporal order story. A chi-square analysis revealed a significant age difference 
for judgments of regret, χ² (1, N = 129) = 12.759, p <.05.  Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that a greater percentage of adults than 6-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 90) = 11.25, p <.01, and 8-
year-olds, χ² (1, N = 92) = 4.621, p <.05, concluded that the target character would feel 
worse about losing the prize.  Also, a greater percentage of 11-year-olds than 6-year-olds 
judged that the target character would feel worse and this difference was marginally 
significant, χ² (1, N = 37) = 3.29, p = .07.  
 The pattern of judgments for blame by others resembled the judgments of regret.  
There was an overall significant age difference, χ² (3, N = 129) = 13.13, p < .01.  The 
percentage of 6-year-olds who concluded that the target character will be blamed more 
was significantly smaller than the 11-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 37) = 4.56, p < .05, and adults, 
χ² (1, N = 90) = 12.22, p <.01, whose patterns of responses did not differ from each other.  
Although fewer 8-year-olds picked the target response compared to adults (55% vs. 76%) 
as observed for the judgments of regret, this difference was only marginally significant, 
χ² (1, N = 92) = 3.53, p = .06. 
 As was found with responses to the omission/commission story, there were no 
significant age differences in patterns of response for the judgments of deserved blame. 
 Additional analyses were run to compare the judgments of regret with judgments 
of others’ blame and the judgments of others’ blame with the judgments of deserved 
blame.  There was no significant difference between the judgments of regret and others’ 
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blame as expected whereas judgments of deserved blame led to significantly less target 
responses compared to others’ blame, χ² (1, N = 258) = 70.17, p <.01.  When individual 
tests for each age group were conducted, it was found that the responses of adults, χ² (1, 
N = 144) = 68.29, p <.01, 11-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 38) = 6.76, p <.01, and 8-year-olds, χ² 
(1, N = 40) = 3.75, p = .05, differed between these two judgments. 
Positive outcome stories. Table 2 represents the percentage of participants at 
each age providing each type of response—target, nontarget, and equal— in each story 
for the judgments of relief, credit by others, and deserved credit.  As in the negative 
outcome stories, for the omission/commission story, the target character was the one 
whose choice was framed as an act of commission and for the temporal order story, the 
target character was the one who made his decision second.  As was done with the 
negative outcome stories, the responses other than “target” were combined into a single 
“other” category for chi-square analyses, and a 4 (ages) x 2 (Target vs Other responses) 
chi-square test was conducted for each judgment type separately for each story. 
Omission/Commission story. A chi-square revealed a significant age difference 
for the judgments of relief, χ² (3, N = 129) = 17.91, p <.01.  Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the percentage of adults who judged that the target character would feel 
better was higher than the percentage of 6-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 90) = 9.95, p <.01, 8-year-
olds, χ² (1, N = 92) = 8.90, p <.01, and 11-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 91) = 4.67, p <.05, who 
provided that response.  The comparisons between the child groups were not significant. 
 The judgments of credit by others revealed a similar pattern of responses. There 
was an overall significant age difference, χ² (3, N = 129) = 13.44, p <.01.  Pairwise 
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comparisons revealed that the amount of adults who chose the target response was 
significantly greater than 6-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 90) = 5.36, p <.05, and 8-year-olds, χ² (1, 
N = 92) = 5.92, p <.05, and the difference between 11-year-olds and adults was 
marginally significant, χ² (1, N = 91) = 3.55, p = .06. 
 Once again, there was no significant age difference for the judgments of deserved 
credit. 
 Additional analyses were run to compare the judgments of relief with judgments 
of others’ credit and the judgments of others’ credit with the judgments of deserved 
credit.  There was a significant difference between the judgments of relief and others’ 
credit, χ² (1, N = 254) = 18.07, p <.01, and an additional analysis showed that only 
responses of adults revealed that difference, χ² (1, N = 144) = 12.81, p <.01.  There was 
also a significant difference between the judgments of others’ credit and deserved credit, 
χ² (1, N = 254) = 7.50, p <.01, and once again, only adults’ responses reflected a 
significant difference between these two judgments, χ² (1, N = 144) = 8.74, p <.01.   
Temporal order story.  There was a significant age difference for the judgments 
of relief, χ² (3, N = 129) = 15.99, p <.01.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
percentage of adults who judged that the target character would feel better than the 
nontarget character was greater than the percentage of 6-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 90) = 9.33, 
p <.01, 8-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 92) = 9.11, p <.01, and 11-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 91) = 4.86, 
p <.05, who provided the same response. 
 The analysis for the judgments of credit by others also revealed an overall 
significant age difference, χ² (3, N = 129) = 12.355, p <.01. Pairwise comparisons showed 
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that more adults compared to 6-year-olds, χ² (1, N = 90) = 3.98, p <.05, and 8-year-olds, 
χ² (1, N = 92) = 9.63, p <.01, judged that the target character would be credited more. 
 As observed with previous stories, an analysis for deserved credit judgments did 
not yield a significant age difference. 
 As done with the omission/commission story, additional analyses were run to 
compare the judgments of relief with the judgments of others’ credit and the judgments of 
others’ credit with the judgments of deserved credit.  There was a significant difference 
between the judgments of relief and others’ credit, χ² (1, N = 254) = 6.99, p <.01.  An 
additional analysis showed that only the responses of adults showed that difference, χ² (1, 
N = 144) = 5.66, p <.05.  There was also a significant difference between the judgments 
of others’ credit and deserved credit, χ² (1, N = 254) = 13.07, p <.01.  Again, it was only 
adults whose responses differed between these two judgments, χ² (1, N = 144) = 13.39, p 
<.01.   
Explanations 
 The responses to the request for an explanation by the participants who selected 
one of the characters in response to each question (rather than responding “the same” or 
“equal”) were classified into one of the three following categories:  
(1) Alternative/Choice: The explanation involves a reference to the alternative outcome 
or the choice of the character (e.g., “Barb[Lia] would feel worse[better], because she 
picked the right[wrong] box at the beginning but then she switched”, “Rob[Tom] would 
be blamed[credited] more/deserves more blame[credit], because they could have 
won[lost] if he had picked the other card”), (2) Other: The explanation involves some 
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element of the story or something that is made up by the participant (e.g., “Barb[Lia] 
would feel worse[better], because her parents are poor and they needed the money”, or 
“Their friends really wanted them to win”), or (3) No explanation.  
The explanations of participants who responded that the two characters would feel 
the same and would be blamed[credited] equally were also divided into 3 categories: (1) 
Same Outcome: the explanation involves a reference to the fact that both characters 
experienced the same outcome (e.g., “they would feel equally bad[good] because they 
both lost[won]”, or “they both lost[won] for everyone), (2) Alternative/Choice: the 
explanation involves a reference to the alternative outcome or the choices of the 
characters (e.g., “One switched and the other did not” or “If they had not picked the same 
card, they could have lost”), or (3) No explanation.   
Although the above categories were sufficient for the categorization of 
explanations that were provided to the emotion and blame/credit from others questions, 
an initial inspection of the explanations that were provided in response to the deserved 
blame/credit question indicated that these questions elicited somewhat different kinds of 
explanations from those provided to the other questions.  Hence, deserved blame/credit 
explanations were grouped into one of the following categories: (1) Same outcome: the 
explanation involves a reference to the fact that both characters experienced the same 
outcome (e.g., “they both made wrong choices”), (2) Chance/Probability: the explanation 
involves a reference to the fact that it is a game of chance or the odds were the same for 
both characters (e.g., “It was a 50/50 chance for both” or “they were equally likely to 
win”) (3) Social Conventions: the explanation involves a reference to social rules of 
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fairness or niceness (e.g., “it would not be fair to blame[credit] one more than the other”, 
“The other would feel sad if he is blamed more”), or (4) No explanation. 
A second coder who was blind to the hypotheses coded 36 randomly selected 
explanations after receiving training for the coding system.  The agreement between the 
first and second coder was high (Cohen’s K = 0.84).  Because the number of responses in 
some categories was small, the explanations were collapsed across the two story types for 
each of the positive and negative outcome pairs of stories for the following statistical 
analyses.  
Negative outcome stories. Table 3 represents the justifications provided for each 
response type (target, nontarget, & equal) at each age.   
Judgments of regret. All participants who thought that the target character would 
feel worse justified their response with a reference to the alternative outcome or the 
choice of the character, with the exception of one 8-year-old.  When the nontarget 
character was picked, again, making a reference to the alternative outcome or the choice 
of the character was the most common justification. 
 When the judgment was “equally bad”, the majority of the participants made a 
reference to the fact that both characters experienced the same outcome although some 6-
year-olds (19%, 4 of 21 instances) did not provide any explanation.  The percentage of 
participants who made a reference to the fact that the outcome was the same for both 
characters was 76% (16 of 21 instances) for the 6-year-olds, 89% for 8-year-olds (16 of 
18 instances), 93% for 11-year-olds (14 out of 15 instances), and 96% for adults (27 of 28 
instances).   
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Judgments of blame by others. When participants judged that the target character 
will be blamed more than the nontarget character by their classmates, participants almost 
always justified their response by making a reference to the alternative outcome or the 
choice of the target character.  The percentages for such a justification was 86% for 6-
year-olds (6 of 7 instances), 93% for 8-year-olds (14 of 15 instances), 95% for 11-year-
olds (20 of 21 instances) and 100% for adults (108 of 108 instances).  When the nontarget 
character was chosen as a response, again, a reference was made to the alternative 
outcome or the choice of the characters most of the time.  
When participants judged that both characters would be blamed equally, the 
common justification was a reference to the fact that the outcome was the same for both 
characters.  The percentages for each age group who provided such a justification were 
59% for 6-year-olds (13 out of 22 instances), 88% for 8-year-olds (21 out of 24 
instances), 85 % for 11-year-olds (11 out of 13 instances) and 88% for adults (30 out of 
34 instances).  A group of 6-year-olds (36%, 8 out of 22 instances) and a few 8-year-olds 
(13%, 3 out of 24 instances) did not provide any explanation for their equal blame 
response whereas some adults (12%, 4 out of 34 instances) made a reference to the 
alternative outcome or the choice of the character. 
Judgments of deserved blame. All participants who picked the target character 
justified their response with a reference to the alternative outcome or the choice of the 
character except 6-year-olds (75%, 6 out of 8 instances).  Only 3 participants (two 6-year-
olds and one 8-years-old) concluded that the nontarget character deserves more blame.  
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The justification for this response always involved a reference to the alternative outcome 
or the choice of the target character.  
 Justifications of equal deserved blame led to a different pattern of responses for 
each age group.  Six-year-olds justified this response either with reference to the fact that 
both characters experienced the same outcome (50% of the time, 13 of 26 instances), or 
by making a reference to social conventions (15%, 4 of 26 instances) and for 35% of the 
instances (9 out of 26), they did not provide any explanation.  Eight-year-olds explained 
their equal deserved blame response by the following justifications: both characters 
experienced the same outcome (56%, 18 of 32 instances), it was just a game of chance 
(3%, one of 32 instances), it is not nice or fair to blame one more than the other (28%, 9 
of 32 instances), or no explanation (13%, 4 of 32 instances).  Eleven-year-olds’ 
explanation for equal deserved blame response was explained by a reference to the fact 
that both characters experienced the same outcome for 36% of the time (11 of 31 
instances), by a reference to the fact that it was just a game of chance or probability for 
26% of the time (8 of 31 instances), and via a reference to social conventions for 36% (11 
of 31 instances) of the time.  For adults, the equal deserved blame judgments were 
justified by the following: a reference to the fact that both characters experienced the 
same outcome (40%, 48 of 120 instances), a reference to the fact that it was just a game 
of chance (45%, 54 of 120 instances), by a reference to social conventions (14%, 17 of 
120 instances), no explanation (1 %, 1 of 120 instances).  
A 4 (age) X 4 (justification) chi-square test revealed that there was a significant 
age difference for the justifications of equal deserved blame, χ² (4, N = 209) = 69.99, p 
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<.01.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 6-year-olds differed from 11-year-olds, χ² (3, N 
= 67) = 18.73, p = .01, and adults, χ² (1, N = 156) = 43.65, p < .01.  Similarly, 8-year-olds 
also differed from both 11-year-olds, χ² (3, N = 71) = 11.79, p < .01, and adults, χ² (3, N = 
160) = 29.25, p < .01.  Lastly, 11-year-olds significantly differed from adults, χ² (3, N = 
158) = 8.89, p < .05, in terms of the justification they provided for equal deserved blame.   
Positive outcome stories. Table 4 represents the justifications provided for each 
response type (target, nontarget, & equal) at each age.  
Judgments of relief. As seen in table 4, all participants—except one 8-years-
old—who judged that the target would feel better, justified this response by a reference to 
the alternative outcome of affairs or the choice of the character.  Similarly, when the 
nontarget character was selected, the most common justification was a reference the 
alternative outcome or the choice of the character.  The numbers in some answer 
categories were too small to test age differences for the justification of the nontarget 
character, because the nontarget character was almost never chosen as feeling better for 
the temporal order story, whereas she was chosen meaningfully often by all ages in the 
omission/commission story (see table 1) and the common justification was that “she 
picked the correct box at her first choice” or “she did not second-guess herself”.  
 Once again, the typical justification for equal relief response was a reference to 
the fact that both characters experienced the same outcome; 85% of the responses of 6-
year-olds (17 0f 20 instances), 92% of the responses of 8-year-olds (23 of 25 instances), 
100% of the responses of 11-year-olds (17 of 17 instances), and 96% of adults (45 of 47 
instances) provided that justification.  
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Judgments of credit by others. All participants who judged that the target 
character would receive more credit justified this response by a reference to the 
alternative outcome or the choice of the character.  The number of participants who 
judged that the nontarget character would be credited more was very small and this 
response was justified by a reference to an alternative outcome or the choice of the 
character for 50% of the time (1 of 2 instances) by 6-year-olds, 68% of the time by 8-
year-olds (2 of 3 instances), 100% by 11-year-olds, and 86% of the time by adults (6 of 7 
instances).  
 When participants judged that the characters would be credited equally, they 
almost always justified this response by reference to the fact that the outcome was the 
same for both characters (e.g. “They both won”). This justification was used for 76% of 
the time (22 of 29 instances) by 6-year-olds, 94% of the time (31 of 33 instances) by 8-
year-olds, 100% of the time (28 of 28 instances) by 11-year-olds, and 99% of the time 
(82 of 83 instances) by adults.  Twenty-four percent (7 of 29 instances) of 6-year-olds, 
2% (2 of 33 instances) of 8-year-olds, and 1% (1 of 83) of adults did not provide an 
explanation for their equal credit response.  These percentages revealed an overall 
significant age difference, χ² (3, N = 173) = 22.86, p < .01.  
Judgments of deserved credit. When participants judged that the target character 
deserves more credit, they always justified this response via a reference to the alternative 
outcome or the choice of the character.  When 6-year-olds picked the nontarget character, 
they justified their response by a reference to the alternative outcome or the choice of the 
character for 67% of the time (2 of 3 instances) and they provided no explanation for 
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33% of the time (1 of 3 instances).  Eight-year-olds never judged that the nontarget 
character deserves more credit and 11-year-olds and adults always justified their 
nontarget character choice with a reference to the alternative outcome or the choice of the 
character (3 of 3 instances for both groups). 
 As observed with the negative outcome stories, the justifications for equal 
deserved credit led to a different pattern of responses than judgments of equal relief and 
equal credit by others.  Although the most common justification for this response was 
reference to the fact that the outcome was the same for both characters, adults made use 
of the justification of chance or probability reasonably often and the two youngest child 
groups either made a reference to social conventions or provided no explanation for their 
equal deserved blame response.  These differences lead to a significant age effect when a 
4 (age) X 4 (justification) chi-square was run, χ² (9, N = 217) = 42.99, p < .01.  Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that adults differed significantly from 6-year-olds, χ² (3, N = 149) = 
27.44, p = .01, 8-year-olds, χ² (3, N = 158) = 16.88, p < .01, and 11-year-olds, χ² (2, N = 
152) = 6.59, p < .05, significantly in this manner.  Also, there was a significant difference 
between 6- and 11-year-olds, χ² (2, N = 59) = 7.44, p < .05. 
The Differences between the Negative and Positive Outcomes  
 The preliminary analyses revealed that the influence of mutability on the 
judgments of emotions and social attributions was more pronounced in the negative 
outcome stories than in the positive outcome stories.  In order to detect whether this 
effect was uniform across the age groups, separate t-tests were run for each age to 
45 
 
compare the judgments of regret vs. relief, blame by others vs. credit by others, and 
deserved blame vs. deserved credit. 
The judgments of 6-year-olds did not differ as a function of outcome.  However, 
the mean for 8-year-olds’ regret (M = .45, SD = .50) was higher than the mean for their 
relief (M = .24, SD = .43), t(37) = 2.48, p < .05.  The same pattern observed for blame by 
others (M = .37, SD = .49), versus credit by others (M = .05, SD = .23), t(37) = 4.39, p < 
.01, and deserved blame (M = .20, SD = .41) versus deserved credit (M = .02, SD = .16), 
t(37) = 2.49, p < .05.  Outcome type significantly affected the judgments of 11-year-olds 
as well.  They were more likely to attribute regret (M = .61, SD = .50) than relief (M = 
.34, SD = .48), t(37) = 2.24, p < .05, and more likely to think that  others would blame (M 
= .55, SD = .50) the target characters more than they would credit them (M = .18, SD = 
.39), t(37) = 4.20, p < .01.  Lastly, adults’ mean of regret judgments (M = .80, SD = .40) 
was higher than their mean for their relief (M = .62, SD = .49), t(143) = 4.24, p < .01.  
The same pattern observed for blame by others (M = .75, SD = .43) versus credit by 
others (M = .38, SD = .48), t(37) = 7.79, p < .01. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION  
 
 
Overview 
 The primary goal of the present study was to examine developmental change in 
children’s judgments about counterfactual-thinking-based emotions and judgments of 
blame and credit—two social causal ascriptions that are related to counterfactual 
thinking.  Although the development of an understanding of these emotions in children 
has been studied previously, no previous study has examined social causal attributions in 
relation to children’s counterfactual thinking and understanding of counterfactual 
emotions.   
A second goal of this study was to examine whether the understanding of 
counterfactual emotions and children’s social causal judgments show a different 
developmental pattern for situations in which the outcome of a decision has been positive 
versus negative.  Previous studies with both children and adults have focused primarily 
on situations leading to negative outcomes and hence, the existing evidence for 
differences between positive and negative outcomes in terms judgments of emotions and 
social attributions is quite limited. 
 Using two stories based on two common biases observed in adults’ counterfactual 
thinking (i.e., Omission/commission & Temporal order), we asked adults and children  
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from age 6 to 11 to judge which one of the two characters in these stories would feel 
worse[better], be blamed[credited] more by others, and deserves more blame[credit].  As 
hypothesized, the results revealed striking differences between adults’ and children’s 
judgments and between comparable judgments across negative and positive outcomes.   
Judgments of Regret 
In line with previous literature (Gleicher et al., 1990; Miller & Gunasegaram, 
1990), for the negative outcome stories, adults consistently picked the target character for 
judgments of regret, that is, attributed more regret to the character who switched 
(omission/commission story) or who was the second player (temporal order story).  In 
contrast, the target character was not the dominant choice for children younger than 11.  
Six-year-olds in particular selected the target character less frequently than did 
11-year-olds and adults, while eight-year-olds’ target responses emerged as a bridge 
between the choices of the 6- and 11-year-olds—always higher than the responses of the 
younger, but lower than the responses of the older children, albeit not significantly.  
Although a majority of the 11-year-olds selected the target character for both scenarios, 
they did that less often than the adults, a difference that was statistically significant for 
the omission/commission story.  An examination of the justifications that participants 
provided for the selection of the target character revealed that, across all ages, target 
character responses were almost always justified with a reference to an alternative 
outcome or the choice of the character, revealing that some consideration of the 
“counterfactual” (the fact that a different response would have results in a more positive 
outcome) affected their response.  
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Some participants at all ages judged that the two characters would feel equally 
bad, but this judgment was particularly common among the 6-year-olds.  The choice of 
equal regret was almost always justified (at all ages) with a reference to the fact that the 
outcome was the same for both characters, revealing that the thoughts of “what 
happened” alone, rather than both “what happened” and “what might have happened”, 
was the driving force for these responses.  Interestingly, 6-year-olds picked the nontarget 
character as often as the target character when judging who would feel worse, but still 
justified this response with a reference to an alternative outcome or the choice of the 
participant.  These findings suggest that for at least some of the 6-year-olds, even when 
they gave some thought to the counterfactual, their reasoning about the effects of the 
counterfactual on the characters’ emotions did not follow the pattern typically found with 
older children and adults.  
Judgments of Blame by Others 
As hypothesized, the pattern of responses for others’ blame judgments strongly 
resembled the pattern of regret judgments discussed above: Six-year-olds picked the 
target character less than did 11-year-olds and adults, while 8-year-olds were more likely 
than 6-year-olds and less likely than 11-year-olds to judge that the target character would 
be blamed more by the others, although their responses did not differ from these two 
groups significantly.  Eleven-year-olds were the closest to adults; although they did not 
pick the target character as frequently as did adults for the omission/commission story, 
they were as likely as adults to provide the target response for the temporal order story.  
The justifications for target character responses almost always involved a reference to an 
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alternative outcome or the choice of the character as observed in judgments of regret, 
revealing that judgments of blame from others were affected by a consideration of the 
counterfactual scenarios and/or more directly by a reflection on the emotional impact of 
the different scenarios on the judgments of blame from others.  
As observed for the judgments of regret, concluding that both characters would be 
blamed equally by their classmates was also a common response across the groups, but 6-
and 8-year-olds were especially likely to pick that response.  Judgments of equal blame 
were almost always justified by explaining that both characters experienced the same 
outcome revealing that the thoughts of “what happened” (without reflecting on the 
counterfactual alternatives) was the determining factor for this choice.  
These findings regarding judgments of regret and blame from others are generally 
consistent with the findings from previous research which has demonstrated that although 
children at age 6 may be able to engage in counterfactual thinking in some contexts, they 
do not seem to apply counterfactual thinking to help with their understanding of emotions 
(Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004).  More importantly, the current findings extend previous 
research by showing that 6-year-olds’ social judgments do not seem to be affected by 
counterfactual thinking, or at least, the same factors known to affect counterfactual 
thinking in adults do not consistently affect children’s judgments of regret and blame.  
In accordance with the previous literature, 11-year-olds and to some degree 8-
year-olds performed more like adults than did 6-year-olds, although the 6- and 8-year-
olds in the present study were less likely than similarly-aged children in the study by 
Meehan and Byrne (2005) to respond in a manner similar to that of adults for the 
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temporal order story.  One possible explanation for this difference is that although the 
stories used in the current study and in the study by Meehan and Byrne (2005) share the 
key elements of the temporal order bias, the counterfactual judgment tasks derived from 
these stories differed from each other in an important respect.  After presenting the story, 
Meehan and Byrne asked children who would feel worse and be blamed more by the 
other player and the participants’ task was making a choice between the first and the 
second player.  On the other hand, in the current study, participants were provided with a 
third option, equal regret or blame, which may have led to a decrease in target responses 
overall in the current study.  This would also explain why even the adults in our study 
provided the target response less often in both stories as compared to previous studies 
where the task was a forced choice between two characters (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990). 
Judgments of Deserved Blame 
Based on the dual theory of moral reasoning (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 2014), 
it was hypothesized that judgments of deserved blame would invoke a more reflective, 
less emotion-focused analysis of the situation than would judgments of others’ blame; 
hence, we predicted that the target character would be picked less for the judgments of 
deserved blame compared to judgments of others’ blame.  The present findings for adults 
are consistent with that prediction and support the findings by Payir et al. (2014), who 
previously found dissociation between these two judgments with adults.   
Current findings also provide the first evidence for the dissociation between these 
two judgments in children.  Although the 6-year-olds’ selected the target equally often, 
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and at a low rate, for both kinds of responses, the 8-year-olds selected the target less 
frequently when making deserved blame judgments than when making judgments about 
blame from others for the temporal order story while the 11-year olds, like adults, 
exhibited that pattern of responses with both stories.  Thus, in all cases in which 
participants were significantly more likely to select the target than the nontarget when 
making judgments of regret and blame from others, participants exhibited dissociation 
between the two forms of blame judgments.  These findings suggest that, as early as 8-
years-of-age, children’s judgments of blame are affected by situational factors differently 
for judgments of deserved blame than for judgments of blame from others, such that their 
judgments of blame from others correspond more closely with their judgments of the 
emotional impact of those situational factors than is the case for judgments of deserving 
blame – the pattern predicted by Greene’s dual theory of moral reasoning. 
The modal response for deserved blame judgments across all ages was that the 
characters deserved equal blame for the negative outcome.  An examination of the 
justifications provided for this response revealed that it was common for participants at 
all ages to justify or explain this response with simple reference to the fact that the 
outcome was the same for both characters, while some participants at each age justified 
their response through reference to social conventions for blame judgments (e.g., that it is 
not nice blame people).  The examination of participants’ justifications also revealed one 
rather dramatic age difference in responses; for the adults, unlike children at any of the 
three ages, the modal explanation for an “equal” deserved blame judgment was that 
because the outcome was actually the result of chance factors, neither character should be 
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blamed at all.  Thus, even though most participants at each age judged that the two 
characters were deserving of equal blame, it was only the adults who commonly made 
reference to the effects of chance when providing an explanation for their judgment.  
Thus, more generally, even when adults and children thought that the characters 
deserved equal blame, they reached this conclusion via different reasoning processes, and 
the emergence of two new justification categories for deserved blame judgments (in 
comparison with judgments of blame from others) shows that different factors are 
involved in the two kinds of blame judgments.  This finding supports our analysis, based 
on the dual theory of moral reasoning (Greene et al., 2001; 2014) that deserved blame 
judgments are more reflective and less emotion-focused than are judgments of blame 
from others. 
Judgments of Relief 
 The findings from the positive outcome stories revealed that for both stories, 
adults were more likely than any child group to judge that the target character would feel 
better than the nontarget character.  Although all children tended to provide the target 
response more in the temporal order story compared to the omission/commission story, 
they did not differ from each other in terms of the target responses they provided.  As 
observed for the regret judgments, the justification for judging that the target character 
would feel better than the nontarget almost always involved a reference to the alternative 
outcome or the choice of the participant.   
 The modal response for 6-and 8-year-olds was that the two characters would feel 
equally good which was also common among 11-year-olds and adults and was justified 
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with a reference to the fact that both characters won no matter what.  Interestingly, the 
nontarget character in the omission/commission story was also picked fairly often by all 
ages, but especially for all children and this response was justified by arguing that the 
nontarget character picked the right box on her first try or that she was confident in her 
choice. 
Judgments of Credit by Others 
 The judgments of others’ credit resembled the judgments of relief in terms of age 
differences.  Adults picked the target character more than did any child group for the 
omission commission story, and for the temporal order story, 11-year-olds were as likely 
as adults to judge that the second player would receive more credit than the first.   
As observed in judgments of relief, for all participants, but especially for children, 
the modal response for other’s credit judgments was equal credit, which again was 
justified by a reference to the fact that both characters and their classmates won the prize.  
Once again, the nontarget character in the omission/commission story was picked 
relatively often; the participants justified this response by a reference to the fact that “she 
picked the right box on her first try” – an explanation that was notably different from the 
explanations provided for responses to the corresponding negative outcome story.  
Judgments of Deserved Credit 
 As discussed previously, the dissociation between the judgments of others’ blame 
and the judgments of deserved blame supported the dual theory of moral reasoning 
(Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 2014).  Because different factors influence blame and credit 
judgments (Fincham, 1985; McGraw, 1985; Payir et al., 2014; Ross & Ditecco, 1975), 
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and the influence of mutability is thought to be attenuated when the outcome is positive 
(Landman, 1987b), no strong prediction was made for judgments of credit by others and 
deserved credit.  Although we found evidence for this dissociation in adults’ judgments 
for positive outcomes, children’s responses did not reveal any difference between others’ 
credit and deserved credit, a finding that contrasts with what was found when the 
outcome was negative.   
Across all ages, the participants tended to judge that the characters deserved equal 
credit for the choices they made.  For children at all ages, this response was almost 
always justified by reference to the fact that the outcome was the same for both 
characters.  Even for the adults, the most common explanation for the judgment that the 
two characters deserved equal credit was that the outcome was the same in each case.  A 
minority of adults, however made reference to chance or probability when they judged 
that the characters deserved equal credit (while none of the children mentioned this 
justification).   
The Differences between Negative and Positive Outcomes 
This is the first study which examined whether children’s judgments of emotions 
and social attributions are influenced by counterfactual thinking across both negative and 
positive outcomes.  As observed in the previous studies with adults (Gleicher et al., 1990; 
Landman, 1987b; Roese, 1997; Roese & Hur, 1997), the effect of mutability was 
attenuated in scenarios with a positive outcome compared to those with a negative 
outcome.  Participants age 8 and older selected the target character more often for 
judgments of regret and others’ blame compared to the judgments of relief and others’ 
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credit, revealing that mutability is less likely to influence social judgments when the 
outcome is positive.  However, this effect was not evident in responses of 6-year-olds 
because they did not show consistent evidence for omission/commission or temporal 
order bias even with the negative outcome stories.    
What explains these differences between the responses of participants across the 
negative and positive outcomes?  Previous studies have found that positive outcomes 
seem to trigger less counterfactual thinking then do negative outcomes (Roese, 1997).  
Hence, we are less likely to take the alternative state of affairs into account and more 
likely to focus solely on the outcome or other factors when making judgments following 
positive outcomes whereas our judgments are more likely to be based on “how things 
could have been different” when the outcome is negative.  The kinds of justifications 
provided with the positive outcome stories (e.g., “It does not matter how they did as long 
as they won)” further supports this view.    
Not only were participants less likely to select the target character with positive 
than with negative outcome stories, but it was also found that the pattern of responses 
across the different forms of judgments varied as a function of outcome valence.  In 
particular, even when participants thought that the target character would feel better, this 
judgment of emotion was not consistently reflected in their credit attributions.  This 
difference in social causal attributions for positive vs negative outcomes may be 
explained by the observation that different factors affect judgments of blame versus 
judgments of credit (Fincham, 1985; McGraw, 1985; Ross & Ditecco, 1975).  
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The Differences between Omission/Commission and Temporal Order Stories 
Although not expected, omission/commission and temporal order stories led to 
somewhat different patterns of responding.  Temporal order turned out to be a more 
powerful trigger of counterfactual thinking compared to omission/commission; although 
the effect of omission/commission was mostly attenuated in positive outcome stories, the 
effect of temporal order was still pronounced on judgments of emotion even when the 
outcome was positive.  Perhaps, in the temporal order scenarios, the focus is heavily on 
the second player because the first player’s choice serves as an anchor and sets the 
context for the second player’s choice.  That a lot of participants in both positive and 
negative version of the temporal order story explained that the second player “made the 
winning decision” or “the pressure was on the second player” when they justified their 
response supports this hypothesis.  On the other hand, the omission/commission stories 
were more complex, involving a comparison across the two characters of the nature of 
their decision process.  
Conclusion 
Altogether, these results support the observations from previous literature that the 
biases in counterfactual thinking do not necessarily emerge together with the ability to 
think counterfactually (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; Meehan & Byrne, 2005; Weisberg & 
Beck, 2012).  Although the exact age when the ability to think counterfactually emerges 
is still debated, it is accepted that children have this capacity starting from age 5 to 6.  On 
the other hand, as replicated by the current study, the effect of biases on children’s 
judgments based on counterfactual thinking is not prevalent even at the age of 8 and there 
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are significant differences even between the responses of 11-year-olds and adults.  
Similarly, current results also strongly support the argument that counterfactual thinking 
ability gradually develops at least until late childhood with multiple layers of this ability 
(e.g., basic counterfactual thinking, understanding counterfactual emotions, anticipating 
counterfactual emotions) developing at different ages.  
Current results also extend the previous findings by showing that the judgments of 
blame and credit can take more than one form.  The findings revealed a dissociation 
between the judgments of others’ blame[credit] and deserved blame[credit], with the 
former being more emotion-based and influenced more by counterfactual thinking biases 
than the latter.  This dissociation was especially pronounced in negative outcome stories; 
starting from age 8, participants judged that the target characters deserved less blame than 
others would attribute them whereas it was only adults who judged that the target 
characters deserved less credit than they would be attributed.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 One limitation of this study is that we were able to test American adults and 
children only, although the judgments we examined might be influenced by culture.  It 
would therefore be interesting to examine these effects cross-culturally.  We revealed that 
deserved blame judgments of children, for instance, can be guided by social conventions 
such as “being kind to others”, so future studies might investigate whether different 
norms guide children’s judgments in different cultures.  
A second limitation of this study is that we examined how counterfactual thinking 
influence children’s and adults’ judgments of emotions and social attributions following 
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outcomes that are actually determined by chance events rather than by morally charged 
acts.  In this context, it is noteworthy how powerful the effects of counterfactual thinking 
were on judgments of emotions and blame by others even for the adults who understood 
that the outcomes were dependent upon chance.  A possible follow-up to the current 
study might involve examining whether these judgments will differ as a function of 
context.  For instance, will children be more likely to take “what might have happened” 
into account in their judgments if the outcomes are morally charged?  Or when they have 
serious consequences?  It is possible that morally charged acts or more serious 
consequences may render the alternative outcome more salient, and this saliency effect 
would help children start picking the target response at an earlier age as demonstrated by 
Ferrell et al. (2009).  
 Although the current findings demonstrated that biases in counterfactual thinking 
do not automatically emerge once the ability of counterfactual thinking develops, it 
should also be noted that these biases are not totally absent in children’s reasoning; they 
are just not as prevalent as they are in adults’, and future studies can examine why this is 
the case.  Does the absence of the effect of mutability on children’s judgments result from 
the underdevelopment of counterfactual reasoning?  Or do children rely on some other 
factors when making such judgments although they are as capable as adults in imagining 
how things could have been different?   
Based on Goldinger et al. (2003)’s findings, Beck and colleagues (2014) argued 
that if counterfactuals are generated automatically but do not affect judgments, they must 
either be suppressed or discounted.  In the current study, when adults spontaneously 
59 
 
judged that the characters deserved equal blame, half of the adults justified this response 
by saying that the chances were equal for both characters, in other words, this more 
reflective judgment made them suppress the temporal order and omission/commission 
biases suggesting that if counterfactual generation is automatic for them, then they must 
have suppressed the effects of it when they judged the characters deserve equal blame.  
On the other hand, when children judged that the characters deserve equal blame, they 
did not provide any clue that they were suppressing the effect of these biases which 
reveals that counterfactual thinking may not be automatic for them.   
Hence, another follow-up study could examine whether differences in adults’ and 
children’s judgments result from automaticity.  As discussed in Beck et al. (2014), 
children might be competent in counterfactual reasoning, but might not yet have 
developed the automaticity that is observed in adults’ counterfactual thinking.  A future 
study can provide further evidence for this account by providing participants with 
explanations of why two characters deserve equal blame and test whether children and 
adults will be equally likely to pick the explanation that suppresses the effect of 
counterfactual biases.  
Lastly, it should be acknowledged that the number of adult participants in this 
study was three times larger than the number of child participants at any age group.  
Hence, the power of the pairwise comparisons between the adults and each of the child 
groups was considerably greater than was the power of the pairwise comparisons  
between any two child groups, a factor that could have affected the pattern of significant 
pairwise-comparison differences that was found here.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. Percentage of Participants at Each Age Who Provided Each Response (Negative 
Outcome Stories) 
       Age  
Story and Judgment type 6 years 8 years 11 years Adults 
Omission/Commission     
Regret (%)        
             Target 
 
17 
 
40 
 
58 
 
85 
             Nontarget 28 10 0 0 
             Equal 
Blame by Others (%) 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal      
Deserved Blame 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Temporal Order 
Regret 
             Target                  
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Blame by Others 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Deserved Blame 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
 
56 
 
6 
17 
78 
 
28 
6 
67 
 
 
33 
6 
61 
 
33 
22 
44 
 
17 
6 
77 
 
50 
 
20 
5 
75 
 
15 
5 
80 
 
 
50 
10 
40 
 
55 
0 
45 
 
20 
0 
80 
 
 
42 
 
42 
21 
37 
 
10 
0 
90 
 
 
63 
0 
37 
 
68 
0 
32 
 
26 
0 
74 
 
15 
 
74 
3 
24 
 
24 
0 
73 
 
 
75 
1 
24 
 
76 
0 
24 
 
8 
1 
91 
 
69 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Participants at Each Age Who Provided Each Response (Positive 
Outcome Stories)
       Age  
Story and Judgment type 6 years 8 years 11 years Adults 
Omission/Commission     
Relief            
             Target 
 
12 
 
16 
 
26 
 
54 
             Nontarget 29 21 37 11 
             Equal 
Credit by Others 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Deserved Credit 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Temporal Order 
Relief 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Credit by Others 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
Deserved Credit 
             Target 
             Nontarget 
             Equal 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
0 
12 
88 
 
6 
6 
88 
 
 
29 
12 
59 
 
18 
0 
82 
 
13 
13 
75 
63 
 
0 
11 
89 
 
0 
0 
100 
 
 
32 
0 
68 
 
11 
5 
84 
 
5 
0 
95 
37 
 
5 
16 
79 
 
0 
16 
84 
 
 
42 
5 
53 
 
32 
0 
68 
 
21 
0 
79 
35 
 
25 
10 
65 
 
7 
4 
89 
 
 
69 
0 
31 
 
50 
0 
50 
 
21 
0 
79 
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Table 3. Number of Instances for Each Justification (Negative Outcome Stories)
   Age  
Judgment/Response/Justification  6 years 8 years 11 years Adults 
Regret     
   Target Character  
      Alternative outcome 
n = 9        
9 
n = 18      
17 
n = 23        
23 
n = 115        
114 
      Other 0  1 0 0 
      No explanation 
  Nontarget Character 
      Alternative outcome 
      Other 
      No explanation      
  Equal 
      Same outcome 
      Choices 
      No explanation     
Blame By Others 
Target Character  
   Alternative outcome 
   Other 
   No explanation 
Nontarget Character 
   Alternative outcome 
   Other 
   No explanation      
Equal 
    Same outcome 
    Choices 
    No explanation     
Deserved Blame 
Target Character  
     Alternative outcome 
     Other 
     No explanation 
Nontarget Character 
     Alternative outcome 
     Other 
     No explanation      
Equal 
     Same outcome 
     Chance/probability 
     Social conventions 
     No explanation     
 
0 
n = 6        
6 
0 
0 
n = 21        
16 
1 
4 
 
n = 7 
6 
0 
1 
n = 7       
6 
0 
1 
n =22 
13 
1 
8 
 
n = 8 
6 
0 
2 
n = 2 
2 
0 
0 
n = 26 
13 
0 
4 
9 
0 
n = 4       
3 
1 
0 
n = 18        
16 
1 
1 
 
n = 15        
14 
1 
0 
n = 1 
1 
0 
0 
n = 24 
21 
0 
3 
 
n = 7 
6 
0 
1 
n = 1 
1 
0 
0 
n = 32 
18 
1 
9 
4 
0 
n = 0        
0 
0 
0 
n = 15        
14 
1 
0 
 
n = 21        
20 
1 
0 
n= 4 
4 
0 
0 
n = 13 
11 
2 
0 
 
n = 7 
7 
0 
0 
n = 0 
0 
0 
0 
n = 31 
11 
8 
11 
1 
1 
n = 1        
1 
0 
0 
n = 28        
27 
1 
0 
 
n = 108 
108 
0 
0 
n = 2 
2 
0 
0 
n = 34 
30 
4 
0 
 
n = 23 
22 
1 
0 
n = 1 
1 
0 
0 
n = 120 
48 
54 
17 
1 
71 
 
Table 4. Number of Instances for Each Justification (Positive Outcome Stories)
       Age  
Judgment/Response/Justification  6 years 8 years 11 years Adults 
Relief     
   Target Character  
      Alternative outcome 
n = 7 
7 
n = 9 
8 
n = 13 
13 
n = 89 
89 
      Other 0 0 0 0 
      No explanation 
  Nontarget Character 
      Alternative outcome 
      Other 
      No explanation      
  Equal 
      Same outcome 
      Choices 
      No explanation     
Credit by Others 
Target Character  
   Alternative outcome 
   Other 
   No explanation 
Nontarget Character 
   Alternative outcome 
   Other 
   No explanation      
Equal 
    Same outcome 
    Choices 
    No explanation     
Deserved Credit 
Target Character  
     Alternative outcome 
     Other 
     No explanation 
Nontarget Character 
     Alternative outcome 
     Other 
     No explanation      
Equal 
     Same outcome 
     Chance/probability 
     Social conventions 
     No explanation     
 
0 
n = 7 
6 
0 
1 
n = 20 
17 
1 
2 
 
n = 3 
3 
0 
0 
n = 2 
1 
0 
1 
n = 29 
22 
0 
7 
 
n = 3 
3 
0 
0 
n = 3 
2 
0 
1 
n = 28 
20 
0 
2 
6 
1 
n = 4 
2 
1 
1 
n = 25 
23 
0 
2 
 
n = 2 
2 
0 
0 
n = 3 
2 
0 
1 
n = 33 
31 
0 
2 
 
n = 1 
1 
0 
0 
n = 0 
0 
0 
0 
n = 37 
31 
0 
1 
5 
0 
n = 8 
8 
0 
0 
n = 17 
17 
0 
0 
 
n = 7 
7 
0 
0 
n = 3 
3 
0 
0 
n = 28 
28 
0 
0 
 
n = 4 
4 
0 
0 
n = 3 
3 
0 
0 
n = 31 
30 
0 
0 
     1  
0 
n = 8 
8 
0 
0 
n = 47 
45 
0 
2 
 
n = 54 
54 
0 
0 
n = 7 
6 
0 
1 
n = 83 
82 
0 
1 
 
n = 20 
20 
0 
0 
n = 3 
3 
0 
0 
n = 121 
96 
22 
0 
3 
72 
 
APPENDIX B  
 
STORIES 
 
 
Omission/Commission Story (Negative) 
In a school, the principal organized a game for the students in each of two classes.  
For this game, a student makes a choice between two boxes.  There is a win sticker in 
only one of the boxes and if the student picks the box that has the sticker, she and 
everyone else in her class each win $10. 
The teacher of class one chose Amy to play the game and showed her the two 
boxes: A green box and a red box.  Amy thought for a while and picked the green box.  
The teacher asked Amy if she wanted to change his choice.  Amy decided to stay with the 
green box.  Unfortunately, the red box was the winning box so no one in that class won 
anything. 
The teacher of class two chose Barb to play the game and showed her two boxes: 
A blue box and a white box.  Barb thought for a while and picked the blue box.  The 
teacher asked Barb if she wanted to change her choice.  Barb decided to switch from the 
blue box to the white box.  Unfortunately, the blue box was the winning box so no one in 
that class won anything. 
So, remember:  Amy first picked the green box.  When the teacher asked her 
whether she wanted to change her choice, Amy decided to stay with the green box.  But 
the red box had the prize so Amy, and everyone in her class, lost the game.  In a different 
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class, Barb first picked the blue box.  When the teacher asked her whether she wanted to 
change her choice, she said that she did want to switch, so she switched from the blue to 
the white box.  But the blue box had the prize so Barb, and everyone in her class, also lost 
the game.   
So,   
(1) Who do you think would feel worse about the choice she made?  Amy, who 
picked the green box at first and didn’t change her mind, and lost because the red 
box was the winner or Barb, who picked the blue box at first but then switched to 
the white box and lost because the blue box was the winner?  Or do you think 
they would feel equally bad?  Why do you think so?  
(2) Because each girl lost the game, no one in either girl’s class won anything.  Who 
do you think would be blamed more by the others in her class for having lost the 
game?  Amy, who picked the green box at first and didn’t change her mind, and 
lost because the red box was the winner or Barb, who picked the blue box at first 
but then switched to the white box and lost because the white box was the 
winner?  Or do you think they would be blamed equally?  Why do you think so? 
(3) Who do you think deserves to be blamed more? Or do you think they deserve 
equal blame?  Why do you think so? 
Temporal Order Story (Negative) 
In a different school, the principal organized a different game.  For this game, two 
students are chosen to play and each student picks a card—either a yellow card or an 
orange card.  If they both pick the yellow card or both pick the orange card, they and each 
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of their classmates win $10.  However, if one of them picks the yellow card and the other 
picks the orange card, no one wins anything. 
The teacher selected Michael and Rob to play this game.  Michael went first.  Rob 
was not in the room when Michael picked his card.  Michael looked at the yellow card 
and the orange card and decided to pick the orange card.  Then Rob came into the room 
and it was his turn.  Rob didn’t know that Michael had picked the orange card.  Rob 
looked at the cards and decided to pick the yellow card.  So, because one picked orange 
and the other picked yellow, neither of them won anything and none of their classmates 
won anything. 
So, remember:  Everyone wins if Michael and Rob pick the same color card.  
Michael went first and picked the orange card.  Rob didn’t know what card Michael had 
picked, and when he went second, he picked the yellow card.  Because one picked orange 
and the other picked yellow, they lost the game.  
So,   
(1) Who do you think would feel worse about the choice he made? Michael who went 
first and picked the orange card, or Rob who went second and picked the yellow 
card?  Or do you think they would feel equally bad?  Why do you think so?  
(2) Because they lost the game, no one in either boy’s class won anything.  Who do 
you think would be blamed more by the others in their class for having lost the 
game?  Michael, who went first picked the orange card or Rob, who went second 
and picked the yellow card?  Or do you think they would be blamed equally? 
Why do you think so? 
75 
 
(3) Who do you think deserves to be blamed more for not winning the game?  Or do 
you think they deserve equal blame?  Why do you think so? 
Omission/Commission Story (Positive) 
In a school, the principal organized a game for the students in each of two classes.  
For this game, a student makes a choice between two boxes.  There is a win sticker in 
only one of the boxes and if the student picks the box that has the sticker, she and 
everyone else in her class each win $10. 
The teacher of class one chose Susan to play the game and showed her the two 
boxes: A pink box and a purple box.  Susan thought for a while and picked the purple 
box.  The teacher asked Susan if she wanted to change her choice.  Susan decided to stay 
with the purple box.  Fortunately, the purple box was the winning box so everyone in that 
class won $10. 
The teacher of class two chose Lia to play the game and showed her two boxes: A 
brown box and a yellow box.  Lia thought for a while and picked the brown box.  The 
teacher asked Lia if she wanted to change her choice.  Lia decided to switch from the 
brown box to the yellow box.  Fortunately, the yellow box was the winning box so 
everyone in that class won $10. 
So, remember:  Susan first picked the purple box.  When the teacher asked her 
whether she wanted to change her choice, Susan decided to stay with the purple box.  The 
purple box had the prize so Susan, and everyone in her class, won the game.  In a 
different class, Lia first picked the brown box.  When the teacher asked her whether she 
wanted to change her choice, she said that she did want to switch, so she switched from 
76 
 
the brown to the yellow box.  The yellow box had the prize so Lia, and everyone in her 
class, also won the game.   
So,   
(1) Who do you think would feel better about the choice she made?  Susan, who 
picked the purple box at first and didn’t change her mind, and won because the 
purple box was the winner or Lia, who picked the brown box at first but then 
switched to the yellow box and won because the yellow box was the winner? Or 
do you think they would they feel equally good?  Why do you think so?  
(2) Because each girl won the game, everyone in either girl’s class won $10.  Who do 
you think will be credited more by the others in her class for having won the 
game?  Susan, who picked the purple box at first and didn’t change her mind, and 
won because the purple box was the winner or Lia, who picked the brown box at 
first but then switched to the yellow box and won because the yellow box was the 
winner?  Or do you think they would be credited equally?  Why do you think so? 
(3) Who do you think deserves to be credited more? Or do you think they deserve 
equal credit?  Why do you think so? 
Temporal Order Story (Positive) 
In a different school, the principal organized a different game.  For this game, two 
students are chosen to play and each student picks a card—either a green card or a blue 
card.  If they both pick the green card or both pick the blue card, they and each of their 
classmates win $10.  However, if one of them picks the green card and the other picks the 
blue card, no one wins anything. 
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The teacher selected Tom and Jon to play this game.  Jon went first.  Tom was not 
in the room when Jon picked his card.  Jon looked at the blue card and the green card and 
decided to pick the blue card.  Then Tom came into the room and it was his turn.  Tom 
didn’t know that Jon had picked the blue card.  Tom looked at the cards and decided to 
pick the blue card.  So – because they picked blue, both of them and all of their 
classmates won $10. 
So, remember:  Everyone wins if Jon and Tom pick the same color card.  Jon 
went first and picked the blue card.  Tom didn’t know what card Jon had picked, and 
when he went second, he picked the blue card.  Because both picked blue, they won the 
game.  
So,   
(1) Who do you think would feel better about the choice he made? Jon who went first 
and picked the blue card, or Tom who went second and picked the blue card? Or 
do you think they would feel equally good?  Why do you think so?  
(2) Because they won the game, everyone in each boy’s class won $10.  Who do you 
think would be credited more by the others in their class for having won the 
game?  Jon, who went first and picked the blue card or Tom, who went second 
and picked the blue card?  Or do you think they would be credited equally? Why 
do you think so? 
(3) Who do you think deserves to be credited more?  Or do you think they deserve 
equal credit?  Why do you think so?
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APPENDIX C 
 
 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
 
Figure 1. Materials for the Negative Omission/Commission Story 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Materials for the Negative Temporal Order Story 
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Figure 3. Materials for the Positive Omission/Commission Story 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Materials for the Positive Temporal Order Story 
 
 
 
